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 Public-Private Joint-Ventures: Mixing Oil and Water?  
Abstract 
The use of public-private partnerships (PPPs) is one of the most distinctive features of 
strategic management in the public sector. However, PPPs can take many varied forms, 
and can present quite different managerial and organizational challenges. One of the most 
significant, yet understudied, forms of PPP to emerge in recent years is the Public-Private 
Joint-Venture (PPJV). Unlike Contractual PPPs, in which public organizations tightly 
specify the service to be provided under contract by private sector organizations, PPJVs 
involve the creation of a new institutional entity that is governed by all parties in the 
alliance. This article examines the distinctive character of PPJVs and draws upon 
documentary and case study evidence to evaluate the ways in which the mixing of public 
and private within this important collaborative form can be managed best.   
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Introduction 
Joint production of public goods and services by the public and private sectors has 
become a common strategy for responding to the contemporary challenges facing 
governments across the world. As a result, observers of the public management landscape 
are witnessing an increase in the variety and complexity in the forms of collaboration 
between the public and private sectors (Skelcher, 2005). However, research in the field 
of public-private collaborations is still developing and has yet to fully examine the myriad 
organizational forms that have emerged during the last decades. In particular, despite the 
long history of the study of multi-firm alliances in the management literature, scholarship 
on the formation and management of cross-sectoral organizational alliances has not 
developed at the same rate (Fischbacher & Beaumont, 2003). Mixing the distinctive 
environments, goals, structures and values of public and private organizations within 
public-private partnerships is likely to add further complexity to the already complex task 
of alliance management. Understanding and managing sectoral differences may therefore 
hold to key to making a success of public-private alliances. In this paper, we explore the 
ways in which such differences shape the management of an understudied form of public-
private alliance – the Public Private Joint Venture (PPJV). 
 PPJVs are a highly distinctive structure for strategic alliances between public and 
private sector organizations. They are separate legal entities formed by one or more public 
organizations and by one or more private companies in which the revenues, expenses, and 
control of the enterprise are shared among all the involved parties. Accordingly, PPJVs 
can be distinguished from other collaborative forms of public-private cooperation by two 
main features. The first is that PPJVs entail the creation of a new entity, and are not merely 
the result of a contract. The second characteristic is that the new entity is jointly governed 
by the collaborating public and private organizations, with the relative degree of 
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representation of each sector on the board of the new organization typically determined 
by the public managers responsible for their inauguration.  
 During the past twenty years, PPJVs have been used for public purposes as diverse 
as the management of local waste disposal (Bovaird, 2004) or to enhance R&D in high 
science-content technology industries (Martin & Scott, 2000); and are increasingly 
regarded as a means for the creation of public value within the education and health 
sectors across Europe (European PPP Expertise Centre, 2012). It is somewhat surprising, 
therefore, that so little scholarly interest has been taken in the nature or use of PPJVs or 
how to manage them successfully, despite their increasing use as a tool of public 
governance across the globe (Castro & Janssens, 2011). What is so distinctive about 
PPJVs? And, what are the main challenges faced by managers of PPJVs? More 
specifically, how can differences between the public and private sectors be overcome in 
order to successfully manage PPJVs? In the following section, we reflect upon the 
distinctive nature of PPJVs, delineating them from conventional contractual 
concessionary types of public private partnership. Thereafter, we explore the challenges 
posed by mixing sectors in PPJVs, drawing on case studies from different countries to 
assess the ways in which sectoral differences can be successfully managed. 
 
The Distinctiveness of PPJVs 
During the past two decades, conventional bureaucratic solutions to the problems of 
government have increasingly been found wanting. Influenced by the tenets of New 
Public Management (NPM), governments across the globe have implemented a swathe 
of initiatives designed to tap into the human and material resources of the private and 
voluntary sectors. Within this context, PPPs have emerged as one of the most popular, 
though controversial, modes of bringing cross-sectoral expertise to bear on complex 
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social issues (see Hodge & Greve, 2007). Not only are PPPs deemed to be a new 
organizational form capable of meeting the challenges faced by today’s public managers, 
but their increasing use is also attributable to the tangible benefits that they arguably bring 
to all the parties involved in the collaboration ranging from improved service quality, risk 
sharing, and cost savings, among others (Bennet et al., 2000).  
PPP forms have been classified from different standpoints (see Weihe, 2008). 
Some classifications have considered the aim of the project as the key marker of 
differentiation. For instance, Hodge and Greve (2007) identify five main goals of PPPs: 
1) Institutional co-operation for joint production and risk sharing; 2) Long-term 
infrastructure contracts (LTICs); 3) Public policy networks; 4) Civil society and 
community development; and 5) Urban renewal and downtown economic development. 
However, other analysts (OECD, 2008) have focused on the formal side of the 
collaborations, by specifying which responsibilities are assumed in the project (such as 
design, build, own, operate, maintain, and transfer). Although these approaches to 
studying PPPs identify important aspects of the operation of such mixed organizational 
forms, they don’t furnish a clear typology of the actual organizational characteristics of 
PPPs. One useful framework for exploring the nature of PPPs is that adopted by the 
Commission of the European Communities (CEC) (2004) to understand the alternative 
PPP arrangements used by member states for the delivery of public services. 
In order to clarify the legal rights and responsibilities surrounding the use of PPPs, 
the CEC helpfully distinguishes between contractual PPPs (henceforth, CPPPs), in which 
the relation between the public and the private sector is based solely on contractual links, 
and PPJVs, in which public and private organizations cooperate by creating a new 
organization to be governed by all parties in the alliance. The formation of CPPPs entails 
the private sector agreeing to undertake the provision of one or more public services under 
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contract; these tasks can include the design, funding, execution, renovation or exploitation 
of a particular service. CPPPs therefore typically take the form of a concession model, in 
which the public sector signs a long term contract with one or more private organizations 
to develop and manage a project (Hammerschmid & Ysa, 2010). By contrast, for PPJVs, 
one or more public and private organizations, respecting the premises of a PPP, create a 
new organization where all the parties share the authority to make strategic and 
operational decisions as a kind of joint venture1.  
Joint ventures are described in the management literature as an agreement between 
two or more organizations to invest equity in the pursuit of a common interest, typically 
as an alternative to acquisitions, supply contracts, licensing, or spot market purchases. 
Critically, joint ventures entail the formation of a common legal organization that pools 
resources from two or more firms until the goals of the venture are achieved (Kogut, 
1988). Accordingly, joint ventures have been attributed with a substantial, continuing 
cooperation between otherwise independent organizations (Harrigan & Newman, 1990, 
pp. 419). This distinctive feature of a joint venture is not unique to alliances between 
private firms. PPJVs too involve substantial and on-going collaboration between formally 
independent public, private and non-profit partners. 
The main characteristics of PPJVs are: firstly, that they require the creation of a 
specific form of legal agreement; second, that the goals of the new organizations have to 
be agreed by all partners; third, that they entail a more active participation and 
commitment on the part of private firms since they share in the governance of the alliance; 
and, fourth, that power and authority have to be distributed equitably among the parties 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2004). Table 1 summarizes the main 
features of classic public sector contracting, Contractual PPPs, and PPJVs. 
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[Table 1 about here] 
 
PPJVs can only be developed in countries that allow for private sector 
participation in the management and ownership of public assets. As a result, they are often 
assumed to be most prevalent in liberal market economies, such as the UK, the United 
States and Canada, which have increasingly opened up public assets to the private sector 
(Whitfield, 2010). However, the use of PPJVs also has a long history as a means for 
managing water and santitation provision in Spain and Latin American countries (Castro 
& Janssens, 2011). Generally speaking, PPJVs are new companies created by public 
authorities in which the public partner retains a majority share, with multiple private 
partners providing services and/or finance, and holding minority shares. Typically, 
though, the board of directors for PPJVs is composed largely of private partners, since 
these are usually more numerous than the public authorities involved in the alliance, 
sometimes leading to a situation where the public partner is in effect a “silent partner” 
with little active input into the strategic direction of the partnership (Castro & Janssens, 
2011). However, as with any sort of partnership arrangement, the actual allocation of 
economic ownership and voting rights varies greatly, often being contingent on the legal 
framework of a given country.  
Within the UK context, three main types of PPJV arrangement have emerged in 
the past twenty years: the company limited by shares; the limited partnership; and, the 
limited liability partnership. Each of these arrangements exhibits subtle differences in the 
opportunities for private partners to reap financial rewards from the venture and for public 
partners to steer the alliance in the event of management deadlock (as summarised in 
Table 2). In fact, in the UK, there are now examples of hybrid forms of interlocking PPJVs 
that involve more than one of the main partnership arrangements identified by the UK 
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Treasury (Shaoul, Shepherd, Stafford & Stapleton, 2013). Whatever the nuances of the 
alternative arrangements for the allocation of economic ownership and decision-making 
rights, it remains clear though that the management of PPJVs is a complex task for public 
authorities, and one that brings to the fore questions about the complementarity of the 
public and private sector. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Managing sectoral differences in PPJVs  
PPPs are generally thought to have the advantage of merging the strengths of the private 
sector – innovation, financial capacity, knowledge of technologies, and entrepreneurial 
spirit - with the social responsibility, environmental awareness, and local knowledge of 
the public sector (Bennet et al., 2000). In constructing PPPs of any form however, public 
managers face multiple challenges associated with managing sectoral differences, ranging 
from the appropriate allocation of risk to determining appropriate performance measures. 
Reflecting on the experiences of management in private firms, Hill and Hellriegel (1994) 
argue that the secret to making joint ventures work is ensuring that the potential 
complementarities of each partner can be successfully brought together. In the case of 
PPJVs, this may be an especially acute challenge since they must seek to benefit from 
partners’ organizational complementarities while also mixing the distinctive 
environments, goals, structures and values of public and private organizations.  
 
Mixing environments 
One of the key differences between management in the public and the private sectors is 
arguably the relationship between organizations and the actors within their environment. 
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Even though public and private organizations both confront a large and complex map of 
stakeholders, the influence that this diverse set of actors has in each sector can vary 
considerably (Nutt, 2006). Public organizations are ultimately held politically 
accountable by citizens who may or may not actually use the services provided, whereas 
the private sector is in the last instance accountable to the shareholders who invest their 
money in businesses. To reconcile the demands of different stakeholder groups, managers 
of PPJVs must make extensive use of consultative practices that incorporate multiple 
viewpoints as well as analytical exercises that test how shareholder benefits can be 
maximized (Nutt, 2006). In the absence of such processes, tensions can arise due to 
differences between public and private interests, especially for private sector partners 
accountable both to company shareholders and the PPJV board of directors (see Shaoul, 
Stafford, Shepherd & Stapleton, 2012). 
Despite the potential divergence between public and private stakeholders’ views 
about the utility of a PPJV, it is still possible to find creative ways to maintain a focus on 
the overarching purpose. The Social Enterprise Knowledge Network (SEKN) (2004) case 
series highlights how not-for-profit organizations can push private sector partners towards 
social responsible practices, because firms value the reputation-enhancing effects of 
involvement with socially beneficial projects. For instance, the joint venture forged in 
Costa Rica by the Foundation of Housing Promotion (Fuprovi), Repretel and Hereida to 
provide assistance to those affected by the Hurricane Caesarand the strategic alliance 
between Danone Mexico and Friendship Home to provide free medical treatment to low-
income children suffering from cancer both benefited from the determined advocacy work 
of nonprofit leaders. Likewise, research on the management of PPJVs in the UK health 
sector has suggested that public sector leaders must stand up to private interests to 
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minimize the risk of private partners dominating the strategic direction of PPJVs 
(Agyenim-Boateng, Stafford & Stapleton, 2012)   
Another important aspect of the challenges associated with mixing environments 
in PPJVs is the divergent approaches to managing risk in the public and private sectors. 
Klijn and Teisman (2003) argue that for conventional CPPPs the political risks of 
government are not easily reconciled with the market risks of business organizations. 
According to them, there may be reluctance to focus on outcomes on the part of public 
organizations and a reluctance to share resources and expertise on the part of private 
organizations. Thus, the risk environment in PPJVs might, if managed badly, prompt a 
mutual locking-up of agreements that inevitably leads government to revert to more tried 
and tested types of co-operation, especially CPPPs. Thus, as the private sector literature 
(see Wassmer, 2010) suggests, it is essential to establish clear guidelines for the 
management of risk, which are agreed by all partners. Where such risk management issues 
are not dealt with up-front, it can result in protracted post-hoc adjustments to sectoral 
differences. For example, in the case of Galileo, Europe’s satellite radio navigation 
system (Mörth, 2007), the security concerns of the implicated governments regarding the 
involvement of private organizations eventually prompted calls for extensive 
renegotiations to ensure that risk was managed effectively. Several commissions were 
convened to resolve these issues by to developing guidelines that ensured each party was 
able to achieve its own objectives.  
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Mixing structures 
Organizational structures often exhibit strong sectoral differences, which influence the 
style of management in public and private organizations. Public bureaucracies are 
frequently regarded as being rule-orientated because of the need to meet demanding 
statutory requirements for due process. By contrast, private firms are not subject to the 
same kind of political accountability pressures and so are thought to be less hampered by 
bureaucratic oversight (Rainey, 1989). Thus, in theory, when allying with the public 
sector and dealing with public managers private sector partners may feel unduly 
constrained by rules and regulations. 
Whereas rules and procedures provide public partners in PPJVs with guidelines 
for the appropriate use of resources, private partners may feel less inclined to be held to 
the same standards. For example, evidence from the Building Schools for the Future 
(BSF) programme in England suggests that private firms involved in the BSF scheme 
have been reluctant to disclose important financial information, citing reasons of 
commercial confidentiality (Shaoul et al., 2012). This has resulted in a severe lack of 
transparency around the financial performance of the Local Education Partnerships 
(LEPs) set up under the BSF programme. To address these types of accountability 
problem, some commentators argue that private partners in PPJVs should be subject to 
the same financial reporting requirements as their public sector counterparts (Shaoul, 
Stafford & Stapleton, 2008).   
One of the main structural challenges posed by PPJVs in the UK has been the 
proliferation of complicated partnership arrangements, which have led to calls for public 
sector managers to receive training in navigating complex PPJV decision-making 
structures (Shaoul, Shepherd, Stafford & Stapleton, 2013). A successful example of how 
to mix public and private structures can be found in the Chinese healthcare system. In an 
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attempt to improve the service provision of Public Hospitals, the Shanghai Local 
Government promoted a series of PPJVs with the U.S. private company United Family 
Hospital (UFH). When UFH started to work inside the hospitals, they encountered 
complex hierarchical decision-making structures which had been unchanged in over 100 
years. To overcome the structural barriers to collaboration that this posed, the Shanghai 
local government invested considerable time and effort in making the private partner 
aware of the operating procedures and regulations of the Chinese health system. This, in 
turn, helped to cultivate the commitment of both partners to the venture and building on 
the knowledge gained from the first pilot experiences, the initiative was then promoted to 
other Chinese cities such as Beijing, Wuxi and Guangzhou (Liu et al., 2013). 
 
Mixing goals 
Maintaining a sufficient degree of alignment between the collective interest and the 
particular interests of each partner is especially challenging. Even if the content of public 
and private goals diverges slightly within PPJVs, they can present a problem for the 
success of the venture. Critically, multiple goals create problems – not because they lead 
to confusion and lack of purpose, but rather because they prompt a status quo bias (Ethiraj 
& Levinthal, 2009, pp. 19), which, in turn, can lead partners to question the very purpose 
of a strategic alliance. Goals in PPJVs should therefore act as a guide for decision making 
and a reference standard for evaluating success (Farnham & Horton, 1993, pp. 31), but 
for such goals to be realized managers should not be pressured to meet too many 
objectives, or deliver instant results. 
For PPJVs, it is important that the board assumes collective responsibility for 
making the alliance work, taking distance from the individual interests of each 
organization involved. However, this can be very difficult to achieve if the PPJV board 
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is composed of only managers from the involved parties. In particular, private sector 
directors may experience serious conflicts of interest because they are accountable to the 
PPJV board for delivering public value for money, but also to shareholders for 
maximizing profits (Shaoul et al., 2012). In many countries, the public sector retains a 
majority share in the ownership of PPJVs to ensure that the focus on creating public value 
is maintained (Castro & Janssens, 2011). However, in PPJVs where private partners hold 
the majority of shares, such as is typically the case in the UK, alternative strategies for 
making sure that the alliance stays on course may be needed.  
The inclusion of civil society actors in the decision-making processes of PPJVs is 
one way that the board of directors can seek to reduce the risk that the alliance will 
become diverted from its original aims (Castro & Janssens, 2011). Likewise, the use of 
external advisors to the board of PPJVs offers a useful means for the impartial mediation 
of the goals of the different sectoral partners, by facilitating cooperation and conflict 
resolution (Krackhardt, 1999). This was the experience of the Business Improvement 
Districts (BIDs) in cities such as Philadelphia, Washington and New York, where 
neighbourhood associations, churches and NGOs contributed to the partnership between 
local businesses and the public authorities to improve the city downtowns (Briffault 1999; 
Ysa, 2007). At the same time, BIDs have drawn upon legal and management advice from 
academics, external consultants and the International Downtown Association (IDA). The 
IDA, in particular, helped the different BID partners to bring their goals into alignment 
through its best practice benchmarking work, on site tours, and seminars to the boards 
(Ysa 2007). 
Although it is possible to bring very diverse partners together successfully, a 
major reason for an early dissolution of joint ventures is still changes in the strategic 
objectives of one or more of the key partners (Cui et al., 2011). In PPJVs, public 
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organizations may alter their approach to the venture in response to political 
developments, perhaps as a result of elections or wider public policy shifts. For example, 
the BSF programme in England was shelved by the UK coalition government on taking 
office in 2010 – though the extant ventures will continue investing funds in school-
building for up to 25 more years (Shaoul, Shepherd, Stafford & Stapleton, 2013). At the 
same time, managerial turnover within the public and private partner organizations can 
pose problems when personnel, personalities and priorities change. Often complex cross-
sectoral collaborations represent an unexpected and possibly unwelcome inheritance for 
new managerial teams (Plumridge, 2007). This again places a more substantial burden on 
the respective partners to sustain a broad consensus about the means and ends of the 
venture than is the case for CPPPs, wherein it is possible to fall back on the original 
contract specification as a basis for (re)negotiation.  
 
Mixing values 
The literature on strategic alliances suggests that the strength of the collaboration between 
the parties of an alliance relies on their perception of the degree to which the identities, 
values and cultures of the involved organizations cohere (Child, 2001). Where this 
cohesion is lacking, there is a corresponding risk of opportunistic behaviour by partners. 
Evidence from one study indicates that opportunism in strategic alliances is correlated 
with the scale of the venture and divergence between the values of the partners (Huang et 
al., 2009). This is a serious risk for PPJVs, since they are frequently developed to 
accomplish large, complex infrastructure projects (Castro and Janssens, 2011) and, 
moreover, public and private managers are often thought to differ in their values. For 
example, through participation in the Galileo project, private partners in the alliance 
gained access to vast swathes of confidential data on network users, enabling them to 
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potentially exploit the trust of their partners in order to open up new markets for their 
products and services. This potential risk could only be managed by empowering the CEC 
to intervene in any situation that could lead to public data being inappropriately exposed 
(Morth, 2007). 
However, even if opportunistic behavior does not occur, the differences among 
the value-sets of both sectors pose a challenge for the management of PPJVs. According 
to Public Service Motivation theory (Perry & Wise, 1990), public employees will be 
driven by their desire to serve the public interest, while private employees will seek to 
further their organization’s interests. In a nutshell, then, the major challenge caused by 
the mixing of values in PPJVs is to help the members of each organization to switch their 
mentalities from the “us and them” to the “we” (Sonnenberg, 1992) – something that is 
dependent upon the degree of trust between partners (Das & Teng, 1998).  However, in 
alliances where public and private organizations need to coexist, trust between the two 
sectors cannot be taken for granted (Rufín & Rivera-Santos, 2012), especially if the public 
and private sector actors have not previously collaborated. The transaction costs 
associated with building inter-organizational trust when starting a PPJV are frequently 
underestimated and present a formidable barrier to their success (Vining, Boardman & 
Porschmann, 2005).  
One practical example of how to overcome value differences and lack of trust 
between public and private partners is represented by the approach adopted by the 
Projecte Territorial del Bages (PTB) in Catalonia. A major reason for the success of the 
PPJV developed by the Manresa Council, the Caixa Manresa (a savings bank) and several 
small private enterprises from the Bages territory of Spain was extensive dialogue 
between parties during the first years of development carried out with the express purpose 
of imparting a sense of collective interest to each of the partners (Saz-Carranza et al., 
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2009). Accepting that high initial transaction costs are a price worth paying for making 
the project a success, the public and private partners strove to create a shared sense of 
purpose from the outset. As a result, not only were the formal relationships and goals for 
the PPJV clearly specified, but partners indicated that the perceived differences in values 
among public and private actors had diminished as the project was developing.  
 
Conclusions 
Across the globe, public authorities and private organizations are taking part in large, 
complex projects in a multitude of collaborative formats. However, the differences 
between the public and private sectors continue to present distinctive challenges to the 
growth of effective collaboration. The pressure to achieve shared goals through PPJVs is 
especially great, where public and private sector differences act as a double edged-sword. 
If badly managed, public-private differences can become an insurmountable barrier to the 
success of PPJVs, but if managed well they can help both sectors and their key 
stakeholders to achieve objectives that would be unattainable otherwise.  
Our exploration of the management of sectoral differences in PPJVs suggests that 
the following practices are important determinants of partnership success. Firstly, 
environmental differences can be overcome by establishing rules and guidelines for 
managing the collaboration up-front, and by encouraging public sector leaders to 
proactively defend the public interest and manage private partners’ expectations about the 
alliance on an on-going basis. Secondly, structural differences can be best resolved by 
requiring that private partners disclose all relevant financial information. They can also 
be addressed by sharing knowledge about internal decision-making patterns – a 
recommendation that implies a corresponding need for bespoke training to ensure public 
sector partners, in particular, understand the complex lines of accountability within 
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PPJVs. Thirdly, contrasting goals can be brought into closer alignment by involving civil 
society stakeholders and external experts in the decision-making process and embedding 
mediation within the work of the governing board. Finally, to ensure that the potentially 
divergent values of the public and private partners do not problematize the success of 
PPJVs, it is essential to build-in time for developing inter-organizational trust during the 
early phases of setting up the alliance. 
Each of the recommendations we advance are dependent upon the capacity of 
public organizations to be more than just “sleeping partners” within a PPJV, which, in 
turn, places a great responsibility on public managers to work hard to uphold the public 
interest. The personal qualities that managers of PPJVs need to display when managing 
sectoral differences have yet to be studied in detail, but are likely to mirror those critical 
to making any collaboration a success (O’Leary and Blomgren, 2009). Attitudes such as 
openness to mutual learning, constant adjustment, being able to give up a certain degree 
of organizational authority, or showing relational leadership behaviors towards the 
employees are critical to the success of partnerships in general (Bardach, 1998).  
As empirical evidence emerges on this important new field of enquiry, new 
propositions and hypotheses will undoubtedly be developed on how public management 
theory and practice can best respond to and shape the growing use of PPJVs. The issues 
discussed in this paper provide the initial outlines for a future research agenda, which 
seeks to explore how public managers deal with the sectoral mixing that takes place in 
PPJVs. As governments seek new ways to deliver services and projects in times of fiscal 
austerity, studies which systematically examine how best to make a success of this 
emerging organizational form will undoubtedly be of immense value. 
 
Notes 
 18 
1 The name of these types of alliances varies across countries. For instance, in Germany 
they are known as “Kooperationsmodell”, whereas in Spain they are called 
“Colaboraciones publico-privadas associativas”. And the Commission of European 
Communities also identifies it as Institutional Public-Private Partnerships (Commission 
of the European Communities, 2004). 
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Table 1: Contracts, Contractual PPPs and PPJVs 
 
 
Traditional 
Contract Contractual PPP PPJV 
Legal 
Framework 
Based on contractual 
relations (public 
contract law) 
Based on contractual 
relations (public 
contract law) 
Creation of a new legal 
entity (private corporate 
law) 
Goal Purchase a specific 
service provided by a 
private firm 
Private sector 
involvement in public 
purposes 
Cross-sectoral alliance to 
realise public purposes 
Intensity of 
the 
collaboration 
One-off 
 
Strategic Integrated 
 
Public-private 
relationship 
Client-Provider Steering of the 
partnership by the 
public sector 
Corporate governance 
arrangements  
Example Contracting external 
providers 
Concession model Joint entity 
Source: Adapted from Esteve et al, 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public 
Actor 
Private 
Actor 
Public 
Actor 
Private 
Actor 
Public 
Actor 
Private 
Actor 
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Table 2: UK Types of PPJVs 
JV Model Main Characteristics Decision-Making Examples 
Company 
Limited by 
Shares 
(CLS) 
The financial 
responsibility of each 
involved party is limited 
to their share’s value. 
Limited companies have 
also been used as an 
intermediary for stand-
alone partnering contracts. 
Generally, 50% or 75% majority 
shareholders can take major 
decisions.  
NHS Local 
Improvement 
Financial Trust, 
involving Primary 
Care Trusts, local 
authorities and 
capital investment 
firms 
Limited 
Partnership 
(LP) 
Partners share directly in 
profit or losses in the 
proportion in which they 
invest their capital. LPs 
permit the existence of 
Limited Partner(s) and a 
general partner normally 
with unlimited liability.  
There is flexibility to determine 
in the agreement the rights to be 
afforded to different partners 
and the extent to which 
partnership law is to be applied. 
If no agreement is in place, 
default provisions may be 
applied that require unanimous 
agreement from partners.  
NorwePP, 
involving the 
North West 
Developmental 
Agency and the 
Ashtenne 
Industrial Fund 
Limited 
Liability 
Partnership 
(LLP) 
This is a relatively new 
form of JV - introduced in 
2000; it is a hybrid 
combining the flexibility 
of a partnership with the 
safeguard of limited 
liability.  
 
As for LPs. Building Schools 
for the Future 
programme in 
England. 
Source: Adapted from HM Treasury, 2010. 
 
